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LABOR HISTORY, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT, AND THE AUTONOMY OF POLITICS: 
THE DOCKWORKERS OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY MARSEILLE 
The dockworkers of Marseille constitute a highly exceptional case in the history of the 
nineteenth-century French working class. Between the Restoration and the Second Empire, when 
labor organizations were regarded a s  illegal "coalitions" under the penal code, Marseille's 
dockworkers were nevertheless openly organized in a mutual aid society that  was actually a 
reconstitution of their old regime corporation. By means of this society, they tightly restricted 
entry into the trade. minutely controlled all work done on the docks, and maintained wages 
superior not only u, those of other unskilled laborers, but to those of virtually all skilled workers 
as well. In a working-class world populated by repressed, fragmented, and struggling labor 
organizations, Marseille's dockworker corporation was supremely unified and self-confident, and 
was tolerated -- sometimes even encouraged -- by the merchants and the political authorities. 
This paper attempts to explain how the dockworkers gained this extraordinary position 
and sustained it over some four decades. It is obvious that  any phenomenon so singular must be 
explained largely by local and particular causes, and much of this article will concentrate on 
peculiarities of Marseille's history. But my aim is broader. I want not only to explain this 
particular case, but to do so in a way that simultaneously contributes to a broader rethinking of 
nineteenth-century labor history. An exceptional case like that  of Marseille's dockworkers lends 
itself to such a rethinking surprisingly well, for what was was once deemed exceptional by 
nineteenth-century labor historians has increasingly turned out to be the rule. 
Before the early 1960s, labor history was dominated by a monolithic model of capitalist 
development. The rise of capitalism meant the growth of the factory system of production, and 
the growth of factories meant the expansion of a proletariat -- and therefore the development of 
radical and class-conscious labor movements. In spite of research that  chipped away at the edges 
of this monolith, i t  was only with the publication of E. P. Thompson's The Making of the English 
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Working Class in 1963 that it began to crumble. Since then, new research has made capitalist 
development seem more and more multiform. Thompson and his many followers have emphasized 
the penetration of capitalism into the handicrafts -- by means of intensified division of labor, sub- 
contracting, sweating, and other exploitative practices that undercut the artisans' skills and their 
control of labor markets and workplaces.' Meanwhile, research on textile factory workers and 
coal miners has found that these supposedly paradigmatic proletarians were by no means the 
regimented and uniformly exploited masses posited by the classical account -- that they formed 
tightly-knit, kin-based communities, that they prized their skills, that they maintained remarkable 
workplace autonomy, and that their relations with employers often took the form of some kind of 
commercial subcontracting rather than straight-forward wage labor.2 Sabel and Zeitlin have even 
suggested that the factory itself was a contingent rather than a necessary product of industrial 
capitalism, and that alternatives to mass production may yet win the day against the "classic" 
satanic mill.3 Across the entire range of industries, nineteenth-century capitalist development 
turns out to have been a most untidy affair. 
Perhaps the most heroic effort to catalog the diversity of the impact of capitalism on 
nineteenth-century workers has been Raphael Samuel's essay "Workshop of the World: Steam 
Power and Hand Technology in Mid-Victorian ~ r i t a i n . " ~  This article documents in staggering 
detail the intimate cohabitation of new mechanical techniques, old handicraft skills, and 
backbreaking manual labor. In his effort to bring some conceptual order to the diversity of 
nineteenth-century British industrial practices,!, Samuel relies on Trotsky's notion of "uneven and 
combined d e ~ e l o ~ m e n t . " ~  This concept was originally invented to explain the deviations of 
backward Russia from the supposedly orderly sequence of Western European development, but 
Samuel transports it from the underdeveloped margins to the very core of the nineteenth-century 
capitalist system -- to the "Workshop of the World." Unevenness, in Samuel's formulation, occurs 
not only in macro-relations between nations, but in micro-relations between different economic 
sectors within a national society, or even between different processes within the same industry. 
This notion has much to recommend it. Capitalism has a unitary logic -- the relentless 
accumulation of capital through the pursuit of profit. But if the abstract logic of capitalist 
development is always the same, opportunities for the pursuit of profit vary enormously over time 
and space, .and evolve as  the capitalist economy itself evolves. I t  is notorious that capitalist 
development proceeds not by uniform incremental growth and innovation in all economic sectors or 
industries simultaneously, but by industry-specific spurts -- booms in cotton textiles, or shipping, 
or railroad development, or automobile manufacture, or micro-electronics. And even within the 
booming industries, innovation or dynamism rarely effects all processes a t  once: the timing of 
innovation was different in cotton spinning than in cotton weaving, in manufacture of locomotives 
than in manufacture of sleeping cars. One of the consequences of this unevenness is a species of 
combined development in the labor force. Growth in the dynamic sector often creates new highly- 
mechanized classically "proletarian" industrial specialties. But it also inevitably stimulates 
employment in less technologically advanced auxiliary sectors -- either pre-existing or new. The 
rise of factory spinning multiplies both hand-loom weavers and field slaves; the development of the 
locomotive calls forth hordes of nawies; automobile factories give rise to repair shops, taxi drivers, 
and filling stations; computers create key-punch operators and programmers. In nineteenth- 
century conditions, the establishment of any kind of factory industry led to a multiplication of 
handicraft workers: masons, carpenters, and joiners to build the factories; builders, tailors, 
shoemakers, bakers and the like to house, clothe, and feed their workers. The most advanced 
techniques developed hand in hand with the most archaic. 
Samuel is concerned above all to demonstrate that the advance of machinery in mid- 
nineteenth-century Britain also meant a concomitant advance in physical toil. But in this respect 
Samuel's article is one-sided; uneven development also created (and continues to create) s i d i c a n t  
pockets of privilege in the working class. The famous "golden age of the handloom weavers" was 
an early and obvious example. Weavers had very high wages and enviable working conditions in 
the era between the development of machine spinning and the adoption of the power loom because 
the flood of cheap machine-spun yarns caused a sharp decline in finished cloth prices, which 
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caused a prodigious expansion in demand for cloth, which in turn caused a scarcity of the as  yet 
irreplacable labor of weavers -- who consequently had very high earnings until the power loom 
destroyed their temporary advantage. The case of the handloom weavers has been recreated over 
and over in the history of capitalism -- with infinite variations -- from the mule-spinners of mid- 
nineteenth-century Lancashire, to the skilled engineers of the nineteenth-century machine 
industry, to the computer programmers of Silicon Valley. Such pockets of privilege are not 
permanent; they may last for only a few years or for several decades before the unpredictable 
lurches of capitalist development wipe them out. But the same lurches that  destroy existing 
privileged categories also create new ones. Although the net effect of uneven development is far 
from directionless,6 neither does i t  result, a s  Samuel's account seems to imply, in a relentless 
increase in toil. Instead, its effect on the labor force is a richly varied, continually changing, 
kaleidoscopic mixture of exploitation and privilege. 
The history of Marseille's dockworkers in the nineteenth-century illustrates with particular 
clarity how uneven development could create, and in time destroy, a privileged category of 
workers. From 181.5 to the 185Os, booming maritime capitalism, when combined with unchanging 
technical and organizational conditions on the docks, raised the dockworkers from obscurity to a 
privileged position unique not only in Marseille, but possibly in all of France. Then, in the course 
of a few years, a capitalist reorganization of dock work destroyed the dockworkers' privileged 
niche, reducing them to little more than unskilled laborers. Although the story of Marseille's 
dockworkers is unusual, i t  traces out a broad pattern that  has been repeated over and over, with 
countless variations, during the history of capitalism. 
The case of Marseille's dockworkers can also contribute to another trend in contemporary 
historical studies -- a growing recognition of the autonomy of politics. The classical conception of 
capitalism as  the advance of the factory was always linked to a reductionist notion of the relation 
between economics and politics. It therefore makes sense that  recognition of uneven development 
should be paralleled by a recognition of the autonomy (or relative autonomy) of politics. Yet the 
vast literature on artisans, which pioneered in documenting the complexity and unevenness of 
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nineteenth-century capitalism, has actually been dominated by a thoroughly reductionist 
explanatory strategy -- an effort to explain workers' politics by their economic experiences. 
If artisans were radical, this line of argument goes, it was because their trades, no less 
than factory trades, were being penetrated and proletarianized by capitalism, albeit in a subtler 
fashion. Case studies of particular trades, for example Christopher Johnson's seminal article on 
French tailors in the first half of the nineteenth century, have shown convincingly that the piece- 
meal proletarianization undergone by artisans could be economically devastating and could have 
powerfully radicalizing consequences.7 Moreover, varying forms of capitalist penetration -- 
increasing division of labor, substitution of unskilled for skilied workers in certain phases of the 
production process, the development of urban putting-out networks or sweatshops, exploitative 
forms of subcontracting, and so on -- have by now been documented for a wide variety of trades. 8 
This widespread advance of capitahst penetration into the artisan trades in the nineteenth century 
seems to parallel the widespread advance of artisan radicalism. 
But if capitalist penetration was widespread, it was certainly not universal, nor was it 
uniform in its effects on the working population. For such penetration to count as a sufficient 
explanation of artisan radicalization, it must be shown that radical artisans were drawn 
disproportionately from those specific trades that were being degraded by capitalist penetration. 
As far as I know, this has never been demonstrated. Moreover, the contrary can be shown for the 
case of Marseille in 1848, where politically radical workers were drawn not only from degraded 
trades, but also from trades that had not been much affected by capitalist penetration and even 
from trades that had been privileged by capitalist d e v e l ~ ~ m e n t . ~  The highly uneven effects of 
capitalist development in the nineteenth century probably created no path of working-class 
economic experience sufficiently general to account adequately for the very broad artisan revolts 
that occurred. 
If this is true, then explaining working-class radicalism will require a close attention to the 
autonomous dynamics of political change itself. Besides asking what socio-economic experiences 
predisposed workers to radical politics10, we must also ask what sorts of political processes, 
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events, and ideologies induced workers to participate in radical political movements. Once again, 
Marseille's dockworkers serve as  an  illuminating case -- perhaps as  a sort of counterexample to 
Christopher Johnson's tailors. Whereas Johnson's tailors epitomize artisans driven to 
revolutionary politics by a tragic degradation of their trade, Marseille's dockworkers represent a 
trade attracted to revolutionary politics in spite of their extraordinary privilege and prosperity. 
Their history indicates, in miniature, how political processes may produce a broad-based radical 
working-class movement even when the unevenness of capitalist development fails to produce an  
economically homogeneous proletariat. 
* * * 
Marseille's dockworkers (portefaixj were a sufficiently extraordinary case that  they were 
much remarked by the authorities and by other observers, especially during their "golden age" in 
the 1840s and 1850s. It is therefore easier to write their history than that  of most nineteenth- 
century working-class trades. Nevertheless, the documentation, however ample for some 
purposes, is very scarce for others. This article, llke most "history from the bottom up," will 
therefore contain a good deal of hypothetical reconstruction based on scattered, diverse, and 
fragmentary evidence. Given the incompleteness of the evidence, it seems best to begin with a 
portrait of the dockworkers in the 1840s and 1850s, which can be based on relatively complete 
documentation, and work backwards from there into the earlier and more obscure decades. 11 
Perhaps the most obvious indication of the dockworkers' privileged position a t  mid-century 
was their high wage level. Estimates of dockworkers' earnings dating from the 1840s range from 
four to five-and-one-half francs a day. Dockworkers were actually paid on a piece-work basis, so 
the earnings might in fact vary considerably around these sums. Moreover, because work on the 
docks was subject to periodic unemployment these figures cannot simply be multiplied by the 
standard six-day week to derive an average weekly wage. But even taking unemployment into 
account, dockworkers were among the best-paid workers in the city. Their earnings were a t  least 
twice those of other men engaged in heavy manual labor (for example, ditchdiggers or masons' 
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laborers), and were well above those of most artisans, who usually received between three and 
three-and-a-half francs a day. In fact, dockworkers' wages were matched only by such highly- 
skilled workers as glass-blowers, shipwrights, machinists, watchmakers, and printers. 12 
These high wages were maintained in part by a strict limitation on entry into dockworking. 
It was very difficult to become a dockworker unless one's father already practiced the trade. 
Among dockworkers who got married in the years 1846 and 1851, no fewer than 70 percent were 
dockworkers' sons. This was by far the highest rate of inheritance of any occupation in the city, 
working-class or bourgeois; the next five occupations were fishermen with 58 percent, ropemakers 
with 47, tilemakers with 46. tanners with 43, and wholesale merchants (the top bourgeois 
occupation) with 42. The average rate for all occupations was only 23 percent.13 These figures 
make it clear that the dockworkers' lucrative trade was a kind of hereditary possession of their 
families. 
The dockworkers' high earnings and extraordinary levels of occupational inheritance would 
have been impossible without a powerful labor organization. The dockworkers were organized 
openly and unabashedly. Their "Society of Saint Peter and Saint Paul and of Our Lady of Mercy" 
was authorized by local officials in 1817, shortly after the defeat of Napoleon and the restoration 
of the Bourbon monarchy. Officially a mutual benefit society, it was actually a straightforward 
reconstitution of the dockworkers7 corporation, or guild, from the old regime. The corporation 
dated back a t  least to the end of the fourteenth century, but its statutes were first written down in 
1704. These had been amended in 1789, just before the French Revolution; the statutes of 1814, 
in turn, were an amended version of those of 1789.14 In 1814, members of the old corporation 
and their sons could join the mutual aid society by paying a nominal fee of eight francs, while all 
other applicants would have to pay eighty francs -- equivalent to better than a month's wages for 
most manual workers. These entry fees were precisely the same as in the old-regime 
corporation.15 In 1841, when the society's statutes were revised again, the entry fee charged for 
non-dockworkers' sons was increased to the impossible sum of a thousand francs. l6 Besides 
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erecting these high financial barriers to admission, the dockworkers' society could also simply 
refuse membership to men who attempted to enter, even if they could pay the fee. 
Restrictions on entry into the dockworker's society also meant restrictions on entry into 
the trade, for the society maintained a monopoly over the loading and unloading of ships in 
Marseille's harbor. Under the old regime, members of the corporation had the exclusive privilege 
of carrying a special dockworkers' sack, and any man who worked on the docks without this mark 
of membership could be fined one hundred livres. This practice lost its legal standing after the 
Revolution, but i t  continued to be strictly observed. In fact the 1817 statutes of the dockworkers' 
society included as one of its regulations that "only dockworkers admitted into the society have the 
right to carry the sack."17 Right down to the 1860s, it was impossible to work on the docks of 
Marseille without being a member of the dockworkers' society and carrying the identifying sack. 18 
The dockworkers' Society of Saint Peter and Saint Paul and of Our Lady of Mercy had a 
much more elaborate formal organization than most nineteenth-century mutual aid societies -- 
more elaborate, in fact, than many eighteenth-century guilds. It had a Grand Conseil of 60 that  
set  general policies, and a Petit Conseil of 12 that  managed its day-to-day business. The - Petit 
Conseil was responsible, for example, for organizing celebrations on the festival day of Saints 
Peter and Paul, with masses, processions, and acts of charity. The Petit Conseil was composed of 
six "visitors of the sick" and six "priors" (prieurs), The visitors of the sick were charged with 
administering the society's generous sickness and retirement benefits, which amounted to six 
francs a week plus doctors' fees and medications in cases of sickness, and five francs a week in 
retirement benefits for men who had worked on the docks for thirty years or more. To finance 
these substantial benefits, the society required its members to pay three percent of their earnings 
as dues. l9 By 1852, the society had holdings of 232,666 francs, placed in various banks and in 
municipal bonds. 20 
The priors were responsible for all affairs of the society connected to work on the docks: 
mediating disputes between teams of dockworkers or between dockworkers and merchants, 
making sure that  teams were not competing with one another so as  to drive down wages, and 
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above all assuring that only members of the society were employed on the waterfront.21 The 
priors also administered an  institution known as the "muse" (la muse). Dockworkers who were 
not members of a regular team, or whose team had no job on a given day, would report to the 
muse, where they were placed on a register in order of appearance and were given daily work as  
they were needed. Any job not being handled by a regular team had to be channeled through the 
muse, and in addition the muse always handled certain types of unloading -- salt and grains, for 
example. By means of the muse, the dockworkers' society was able to apportion equitably the 
available work, and to cushion its members against unemployment.22 Finally, the priors were 
also responsible for overseeing the nature and techniques of work. The society was resolutely 
opposed to any technical innovations, and in 1853 it adopted a regulation formally banning all 
wheeled vehicles from the docks: prescribing that all burdens be carried on the dockworkers' 
backs.23 The society not only had a monopoly of work on the docks, it also determined how the 
work was to be done and, through its priors, enforced its own regulations. Its control of work was 
virtually absolute. 
In the 1840s and 1850s, then, the dockworkers enjoyed an enviable position. Not only 
were they extremely well-paid, but they had unmatched job-security, a workable pension plan, and 
an equitable system of allocating work during periods of unemployment. Their elaborately 
organized society was tolerated by the authorities, and by means of their society the dockworkers 
themselves controlled the organization and pace of their work, kept interlopers off the docks, and 
saw to it that good wages and working conditions were maintained. Moreover, dockworkers knew 
they could pass all these advantages on to their sons. By comparison with almost any other 
workers in Marseille -- or in France for that matter -- the dockworkers had a very comfortable 
situation. 2 4 
The privileges of the dockworkers"society were firmly established in the first years of the 
Restoration. But these privileges did not guarantee prosperity immediately; they became 
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genuinely lucrative only when the long capitalist boom of the second quarter of the nineteenth- 
century quickened the activity of Marseille's port. Explaining the rise of the dockworkers' to their 
"golden age" in the 1840s and 1850s requires two steps. First we must account for the initial 
establishment of the society's privileges in the early years of the Restoration. Then we must trace 
out the effects on the dockworkers of the sustained expansion of maritime commerce from the 
early 1820s to the late 1840s. 
The dockworkers' society was established by a provisional decree of the Marquis 
d7Albertas, the prefect of the Bouches-du-Rhone, in 1814, only a few months after the restoration 
of the Bourbon monarchy. The statutes of the society were then officially approved in 1817 by the 
Marquis de Montgrand, mayor of Marseille. Existing documents do not make entirely clear the 
reasons for d'Albertas7 and de Montgrand's support of the dockworkers. It was' of course, far  
from rare for officials of the Restoration to have sympathy for old regime guilds, which were 
viewed by many conservatives a s  a means of maintaining deference and discipline among the 
lower orders. But the Restoration's official policy was to maintain Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
legislation guaranteeing "libre echange," and no wholesale reestablishment of the guilds was 
undertaken. No other trade in Marseille was treated like the dockworkers, and few, if any, were 
so treated elsewhere in France. In both a national and a local perspective, the dockworkers' 
society was an anomoly. Official sanction for its statutes would have been impossible to obtain 
had not the authorities regarded the dockworkers' and their association as somehow exceptional. 
When de Montgrand proposed official approval of the dockworkers' statutes in 1817, the 
Comte de Villeneuve-Bargement, d7Albertas7 successor as prefect, in fact questioned their legality. 
De Montgrand, who was the dockworkers' principal patron from 1814 until he resigned from office 
after the July Revolution in 1830, managed to overcome the prefect's misgivings. In a letter of 29 
September, 1817, he claimed that  even under the old regime the dockworkers' association had not 
had "the character of a privileged corporation;" its statutes had been "purely the result of mesures 
of public interest decreed ... for the maintenance of an order necessary among the men of that  
profession." These reasons were as  valid in 1817 as they had been before the Revolution; the 
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society's regulations would maintain "a discipline extremely favorable to tranquility, to public 
order, to the observation of principles of honesty and fidelity indispensable to the interests of 
commerce." Moreover, de Montgrand argued, regulations analogous to the proposed statutes of 
Marseille's dockworkers existed for work "on the quais and in the ports" of cities all over France. 
He even procured a copy of the recently enacted statutes of the dockworkers of Nantes to 
illustrate this argument.25 Finally, de Montgrand argued that  approving the statutes would have 
the additional benefit of assuring the dockworkers' loyalty to the new monarchical regime. "I will 
not speak, Monsieur le Comte, of the essential advantage there is for authority, from the political 
point of view, of keeping under a regular dependence, by its direct action on the heads of the 
association, a so numerous mass of men whose lapses or movements could in many circumstances 
"26 
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be very disquieting. 
But this political advantage was incidental u, the central point. Dock work, de Montgrand 
implied, had a special public character that  distinguished i t  from other other trades, and it was 
therefore acceptable for the municipality to approve regulations that  assured its orderly 
performance. Rather than working in enclosed private spaces subject to the private discipline of 
the proprietor or entrepreneur, dockworkers worked in an  outdoor public space controlled by the 
municipality. A regulation of dockwork, therefore, could be seen as a simple exercise of the 
municipality's police authority -- which in this case was to be largely delegated to the dockworkers' 
organization itself. The dockworkers' society, then, was a kind of semi-public institution. As such, 
it was expected, under the old regime and under the new, to perform certain public functions for 
the municipality. The society was required by its statutes, both in 1789 and in 1817, to constitute 
itself a s  an emergency fire brigade a t  the command of the municipality.27 In the eighteenth 
century, the dockworkers' corporation had frequently been called in by the municipality to help 
maintain order, for example in 1777 during an official visit of Louis XVI's brother, in 1781 to 
guard the door of the cathedral during a mass celebrating the birth of the Dauphin, in 1784 during 
a balloon launching, and in 1789 after the pillaging of the house of a tax farmer.28 
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In any case, the dockworkers' society was treated very differently from associations 
organized by other groups of workers -- whose attempts to limit entry into the trade, to control the 
nature and pace of work, or to maintain wage levels had to be carried on in secret. De Montgrand 
not only approved the charter of the dockworkers' society and defended i t  against the prefect, but 
was deeply involved in the day-to-day administration of its affairs -- intervening in disputes about 
work, fines, expulsions, and the like.29 Until his replacement after the July Revolution of 1830, 
de Montgrand seems to have regarded the dockworkers' society almost a s  an auxiliary branch of 
the municipal government, one subject to his continual and benevolent oversight. 
This persistent support from the mayor and the municipality enabled the dockworkers' 
society to establish itself firmly on the waterfront. Institutionally, the dockworkers' society seems 
to have functioned as  effectively in the 1820s as  i~ did during the dockworkers' golden age in the 
1840s and 1850s. Although the dockworkers seem to have been involved in more disputes with 
other transport workers in the 1810s and 1820s than in succeeding decades, they successfully 
maintained their monopoly against all challenges. No satisfactory figures on wages are available 
for the early decades, but what evidence there is indicates that  the piece rates paid to dockworkers 
were essentially the same in the late 1810s as at m i d - c e n t ~ r ~ . ~ ~  Moreover, evidence taken from 
the marriage registers of the early 1820s shows that  the occupation of dockworker was passed on 
from father to son at essentially the same very high rate in the 1820s as it was at mid-century. 
Dockworkers who got married in 1821 and 1822 were sons of dockworkers in 73 percent of the 
cases -- once again the highest rate of inheritance of any occupation in the city. In all these 
respects, the dockworkers' control over their trade seems to have been as  solid in the 1820s as  it 
was the 1840s or 1850s. 
But even with all these advantages, the dockworkers seem to have been far less 
prosperous in the late 1810s and the 1820s than they became in subsequent decades. During the 
French Revolution and the Napoleonic period, dockworkers had been decimated by the effects of 
maritime war and blockade, which had cut the traffic of the port to a trickle. Even after the 
revival of maritime commerce in the 1820s, their situation was by no means brilliant. It was only 
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the long capitalist boom of the French and European economies during the second quarter of the 
nineteenth century that made possible the prosperity of the 1840s and 1850s. Between 1821 and 
185 1, the population of Marseille nearly doubled, and the traffic of the port more than doubled -- 
with the precise figure varying according to the method of e ~ t i m a t i o n . ~ ~  This prodigious growth 
in the traffic of the port, which can be seen in Figure 1, was a consequence of several factors -- an 
absence of general European wars, an expansion of world trade, the development of industry in 
Marseille, in France, and in the rest of Europe, and improvements in communications from 
Marseille to the inland of ~ r a n c e . ~ ~  Figure 1 about here.] 
One would expect this rapid increase in the activity of the port to have brought about an 
equivalent rise in the number of dockworkers. But in fact the number of dockworkers in Marseille 
appears to have been virtually constant. There are no really satisfactory figures for the number 
of dockworkers employed in the city before the middle of the nineteenth century. But a rough 
estimate of changes in the size of the labor force can be derived from figures for the number of 
dockworkers who got married in a given year.33 This figure averaged thirty-nine per year in 
1821 and 1822, and remained essentially unchanged, a t  an  average of thirty-seven per year, in 
1846 and 1851. Thus, in a period when the amount of labor to be done approximately doubled, 
the number of dockworkers available to do it remained essentially constant. These figures seem to 
indicate an enormous change in the market for dockworkers' labor, one that, according to 
conventional economic theory, should have resulted in a steep rise in wage rates. Yet the 
evidence, which admittedly is thin, seems to indicate no important rise in the piece-rates paid to 
dockworkers in this period. What the available evidence suggests is a quite different development, 
but one no less favorable to the dockworkers. 
By all reports, Marseille's dockworkers were able to handle the volume of goods that 
entered the port in the 1840s without either relaxing restrictions on entry into their society or 
allowing non-society men to work on the docks. This implies that there must have been a good 
deal of slack twenty or thirty years earlier, when the same number of men were handling only 
half as  much work. This in turn suggests that unemployment and underemployment may have 
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been very common in the 1820s and early 1830s, and that  the main effect of the commercial boom 
on Marseille's dockworkers was not to increase wage rates but to increase the level of employment 
-- by increasing either hours of labor, or intensity of labor, or both. Since dockworkers were paid 
by fixed piece-rates, the result of any of these increases in employment should have been a 
proportional rise in their earnings. Evidence bearing on this question is extremely scarce, but 
most if it is compatible with this picture of a constant labor force whose level of employment rose 
substantially over time. 
The first piece of evidence -- hardly conclusive -- is literary in nature. It derives from the 
memoirs of Victor Gelu, a writer and singer of Provencal songs, who was born in a popular 
quarter of Marseille in 1806. As a young man in the middle l820s, Gelu spent much of his time 
drinking, singing and gambling with young worker friends. Dockworkers were especially 
prominent among his drinking companions. When he was looking for entertainment, Gelu would 
stroll down to a neighborhood barbershop which had a back room where young men gathered to 
talk, to drink, and above all to gamble. There he was always sure of fmding plenty of 
dockworkers temporarily out of work; according to Gelu, this particular barbershop had so many 
dockworkers that  it "had become almost a branch office of the   use."^^ From Gelu's account, i t  
would appear that  days of unemployment -- enlivened by drinking and gambling -- were a normal 
experience of dockworkers, or a t  least of young dockworkers, in the 1820s. 
The second piece of evidence -- suggestive, but not much more conclusive than the first -- is 
the pattern of contestation on the docks. The period of the largest number of disputes seems to 
have been the late 1810s and the early 1820s, and from what little we know of these disputes, 
they usually seem to have involved the problem of unemployment in some way. Thus, in 1819 
and 1821 the dockworkers protested that  sailors were being used to unload ships, thereby 
depriving them of work; and in 1824 dockworkers registered a t  the Muse complained to the Priors 
that  some of the masters were bypassing the Muse and taking on new men of their own choice. 
And throughout the period there were troubles between dockworkers and "robeirols" -- laborers 
who waited around on street-corners, ready to undertake assorted carrying tasks.35 In principle, 
15 
these robeirols were easily distinguishable from dockworkers by the baskets they wore on their 
backs, which they used for carrying their loads -- as opposed to the sacks of the  dockworker^.^^ 
This pattern of contestation -- frequent disputes involving issues of employment in the 1820s, 
followed by a virtual absence of disputes in the 1830s and 1840s -- seems to fit the hypothesis of 
initially high levels of unemployment, followed by increasingly full employment in the 1830s and 
1840s. One might have expected a rather different pattern of contestation had the rise in demand 
for dockworker's labor been met mainly by changes in wage-rates. In such circumstances one 
might have expected relative quiescence in the early period, when high unemployment rates would 
have put workers in a weak bargaining position, and increasing contestation over wage levels as  
the workers took advantage of their increasing relative scarcity to force a raise in their rates. 
The third piece of evidence -- in my opinion somewhat more conclusive than the other two - 
- concerns changes in the number of workers employed in other heavy transportation trades. 
Although the number of dockworkers appearing on the marriage registers remained constant, the 
number of men identifying themselves as "carters" or "loaders" rose very sharply, from only 
fifteen per year in the early 1820s to fifty-three per year a t  mid-century. If these carters and 
loaders are added to the thirty-nine and then thirty-seven dockworkers, the rise in heavy 
transportation workers as a whole was from fifty-four in the early 1820s to ninety a t  mid-century 
-- not as steep as  the rise in the traffic of the port, but nearly so. (See table 1.) These figures 
seem to indicate a major change in the employment pattern of dockworkers. [Table 1 about here.] 
In the 1820s, dockworkers may have been supplementing the earnings they gained from loading 
and unloading of ships by engaging in assorted other carrying and hauling jobs which they picked 
up on a day-labor basis. By the late 1840s, dockworkers seem to have concentrated exclusively on 
loading and unloading ships, leaving other heavy carrying work to much less well-paid loaders and 
carters -- who were recruited mainly from migrants to Marseille, and above all from migrants of 
peasant and unskilled  background^.^^ 
Thus the available evidence suggests a marked change in the dockworkers' real conditions 
between 1830 and 1848, in spite of the surface continuity of institutions. The dockworkers' 
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society was no less elaborate in the 1820s than it became by mid-century, its monopoly of work on 
the docks was no less complete, and men were every bit as capable of passing their occupations on 
to their sons. But these privileges -- and privileges they were in the 1820s -- were far less 
lucrative than they became by the 1840s. Unemployment and underemployment were endemic. 
Wages were good as long as work was available, but days without work were all too common. 
Thus dockworkers spent many daylight hours drinking and playing cards in the local bistros and 
caf;s, and -- it appears -- often took low-paying jobs doing assorted hauling and carrying to make 
ends meet. And in a time when work on the docks was scarce, conflicts about its allocation -- 
among dockworkers, between dockworkers and sailors, or between dockworkers and robeirols -- 
were frequent. Dockworkers were by no means desperate or impoverished in the 1820s or early 
1830s -- their wages were good when they were worlung, and income could be supplemented by 
occasional day labor. But they were by no means so prosperous as  they had become by mid- 
century. 
By the 1840s, some prominent Marseillais had begun to denounce the dockworkers' society 
for its restrictive practices. The most notable was Jules Julliany, premier adjoint to the mayor 
under the July Monarchy, and the author of a vast compendium on the commerce of the city. 
Writing in the early 1840s, he proposed that  the city's merchants act to rid themselves of "this 
monopoly [which has] always weighed on the commerce of Marseille" by simply ignoring the 
regulations of the dockworkers' society and hiring other workers of their choice. This, Julliany 
implies, would probably be met by violent resistance from the dockworkers' society. But if the 
merchants' chosen workers "were troubled or menaced, judicial authority, aided if necessary by 
military authority, would not fail to arrest and punish those who made themselves guilty of 
assaults or  threat^."^' Julliany was almost certainly right that  the state, if called in to a dispute, 
would have backed the merchants and broken the dockworkers' monopoly by force: the restrictive 
practices of the dockworkers' society were a blatant violation of both the le Chapelier law and the 
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criminal code. Moreover, dock work did not require a long period of training, and there were 
always plenty of badly paid and underemployed men in the city -- particularly Italian immigrants 
-- who could have been recruited to load and unload ships at rates far below those maintained by 
the dockworkers' society. Yet the merchants ignored Julliany's suggestions and continued 
uncomplainingly to accept the society's restrictive regulations and pay its high rates. Given that  
Marseille's merchants had a reputation for being astute businessmen, i t  is puzzling that  they 
continued to submit to this costly monopoly, especially after 1830, when the mayor who had been 
the dockworkers' patron had resigned and the officials of the July Monarchy were loudly 
declaiming the virtues of laisser faire. 
There are reasons to think that  the merchants knew what they were doing, but explaining 
the merchants' toleration of the dockworkers' society requires a closer look a t  the organization of 
work on the docks. The loading and unloading of ships was carried out by teams of dockworkers, 
which might consist of ten to twenty men, headed by a master dockworker. The masters were 
named not by the dockworkers' society, but by the merchant whose goods were being handled. 
The master was the merchant's representative on the docks. He recruited, organized, supervised, 
and paid his team of workers, and often handled such formalities a s  customs clearance as  well. 
According to tradition, each dockworker, the master included, was to get an equal share of pay for 
the work accomplished. The master, however, could work for more than one merchant, and could 
have more than one team working a t  a given t ime  he also probably benefited from various 
bonuses and gratutities from the m e r ~ h a n t . ~ '  A few of the master dockworkers actually became 
well-to-do; twenty of them (out of perhaps 100) met the substantial property qualifications 
required to become electors of the July Monarchy in 1844.~'  But the masters and simple 
workmen were equal in the eyes of the dockworkersy society: no privileges attached to the position, 
and dues, fees, obligations, and benefits of membership were the same for all. There was a 
tendency for masters to be overrepresented among officers of the society, but they never 
monopolized offices and there seem to have been very few complaints of prejudicial treatment by 
the ordinary workers. For whatever reasons -- and the sources unfortunately are virtually silent 
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on relations between masters and workers -- teams of dockworkers seem generally to have worked 
together in harmony. 
The master and his team of dockworkers were employed directly by the merchant whose 
goods were being loaded or unloaded. Marseille's merchants in the mid-nineteenth century carried 
on business much as they had in the eighteenth or seventeenth centuries. Down to the 1850s, it 
was typical for each voyage of a ship to be financed by a different group of businessmen. The 
ship's captain, merchants whose goods were to be carried, and perhaps a banker or a retired 
capitalist would become partners for a single voyage. When the ship returned, the profits or 
losses would be divided and the partnership dissolved, and a new partnership, normally including 
a different set of partners, would be established. A given merchant would be involved in several 
different ventures a t  once. He might have three or four ships coming in during a two-week period 
and then have none the next month.41 A merchant's demand for labor was therefore extremely 
sporadic -- he wanted to be able to hire a team of men to load or unload a ship when he needed 
them, and he wanted to be sure that they would do the work efficiently and honestly with a 
minimum of supervision. Rather than having to hire a full-time assistant to supervise loading and 
unloading operations, merchants could count on the master dockworkers and their teams to take 
charge of the work when it needed doing. Moreover, the dockworkers7 society itself guaranteed 
responsible and orderly work on the docks, mediating whatever disputes might arise, providing 
extra workers from the muse when they were required, and generally overseeing loading and 
unloading of ships. From this perspective, the high wages paid to the dockworkers begin to seem 
a much better bargain. When a merchant hired a team of dockworkers, he was getting much 
more than willing muscles; he was also, in effect, putting out or subcontracting the management 
of dockwork to the masters and the dockworkers' society. 
The high wages paid to dockworkers thus paid for both physical labor and management 
services. But they also paid for something else: security of the cargoes. The dockworkers' society 
assured the honesty of the workers and effectively policed the docks. Pilferage is a chronic 
problem on the docks in all times and places, but it was -- a t  least potentially -- particularly acute 
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in nineteenth-century Marseille. Marseille's port basin was a rectangular inlet nestled between 
steep hills on the north and south. The old city of Marseille was built on the slope of the hill 
immediately to the north of the port, and by the end of the seventeenth century, the city 
surrounded the port on all sides. The old city neighborhoods to the north of the port, which were 
crowded, labyrinthine, poor, and dangerous, reached right down to the quais.42 (See Figure 2.) 
The narrow quais -- never very ample even in the eighteenth century -- became extraordinarily 
encumbered with the explosive growth of maritime commerce in the nineteenth. In these 
circumstances a dishonest dockworker could disappear into the old city in an instant with valuable 
cargoes. This danger was multiplied by the fact that goods in entrep t had to be carried to 
entrep t warehouses scattered all over the city. The dockworkers' honesty, consequently, was a 
major financial consideration for merchants. 
The dockworkers' society assured its members' honesty not only by its general tone of 
discipline and order, but by specific regulations. The statutes of the dockworkers' society stated 
that dockworkers convicted of theft by the courts were to be banished from the society -- and 
therefore from the docks as well. But the society also instituted its own proceedings against any 
dockworker denounced by the priors for having "permitted himself the baseness of embezzling, 
hiding or hoiding back some portion of merchandise" or for "lacking fidelity in whatever way." If 
the case against the accused was judged by the society's general assembly to be factual, he was 
expelled from the society and the outcome of the assembly's deliberation was sent to the H tel de 
Ville "so that no one will remain ignorant" of the expulsion. By this means, the society guarded 
itself and the docks against dishonest dockworkers even if the merchant whose goods had been 
filched declined to press charges in the courts.13 One reason the merchants were willing to pay 
the high wages enforced by the dockworkers' society was that the society protected them against 
potentially large losses from pilfering. 
The dockworkers' society, then, was an integral part  of the maritime economy of mid- 
nineteenth-century Marseille. The society had grown up in tandem with Marseille's merchant 
community, and the relations they had established were mutually beneficial as  long as no major 
changes took place in the overall organization of commerce. Even the huge rise in demand for 
dockworkers' labor that resulted from the commercial boom of the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s failed 
to upset existing relations between dockworkers and merchants. Because the rising demand for 
labor was met by eliminating the dockworkers' irregularity of employment and by leaving other 
loading and carrying jobs to unskilled carters and robeirols, it resulted in no upward pressure on 
the dockworkers7 piece-rate wages. Dockworkers' earnings rose substantially, yet the costs faced 
by a merchant hiring a team of dockworkers for a day in the 1840s or 1850s was virtually the 
same as  it had been in the 1820s. For this reason, the dockworkers were able to gain an 
enormous advantage from the maritime boom without adversely affecting the profits of their 
employers, the merchants. Until the great transformation of the docks and the maritime economy 
that began to take shape toward the end of the 185Os, neither the merchants nor the municipality 
had any reason to challenge the power of the dockworkers' society. The society relieved the 
merchants of responsibility for supervising loading and unloading operations, it protected them 
against the danger of rampant waterfront theft, and its members' growing prosperity in the 1830s 
and 1840s did not increase the merchants7 costs. Consequently, the dockworkers were secure and 
prosperous, for the time being, in a protected niche. 
If the expansion of commerce posed no immediate challenge to the customary organization 
of dock work in Marseille, it soon began to strain the physical capacity of the old port. The port 
was already overcrowded by the 1820s, and by the middle 1830s the situation became critical. 
Several stop-gap measures were undertaken, such as  the razing of buildings along the northern 
edge of the port to expand the surface of the docks, and dredging the port's southeastern corner to 
make room for another twenty to thirty ships. But even after improvements, the docks measured 
only 3,200 meters for an annual traffic of seven to eight thousand ships in the late 1840s. By 
contrast, Le Havre, Marseille's chief French competitor, had 5,920 meters of docks for fewer than 
five thousand ships.44 Minor improvements were insufficient to alleviate the problem; the traffic 
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of the port grew far faster than the available space. Crowding was further exacerbated in the 
1830s by the appearance of steamships, which were much larger than sailing vessels and difficult 
to accommodate in the confines of the old port. 
I t  was clear that a new basin comparable in size to the old port was needed. Given the 
geography of Marseille, this meant a gigantic program of construction. The old port is the only 
part of the coastline of Marseille which naturally has at once shelter against storms, good access 
to the shore and sufficient depth of water, all of which are required for a good port. The 
immediately adjacent coastline both to the north and to the southwest of the old port was so 
jagged, steep, and rocky as to make the difficulty and cost of construction almost prohibitive. (See 
figure 2.) For eight years, from 1835 to 1843, engineers, entrepreneurs, the Chamber of 
Commerce, and representatives of the local and national government haggled over dozens of rival 
plans for new port basins, finally agreeing on the area immediately to the north of the old port. 
Work on the project began in 1844, and the new basin was already usable in 1847, when it was 
crowded by vessels carrying wheat to provision France's exhausted granaries. Work on the new 
port was fully completed in 1853. But as  early a s  1848, the local director of the Fonts et  chauses 
(the government civil engineering corps) had decided that a further northward extension was 
n e ~ e s s a r y . ~ ~  The Revolution of 1848, and the financial insolvency and reduction in port traffic 
that it brought in its wake, interrupted plans for extension. By 1852, however, maritime 
commerce began to grow a t  its pre-1848 pace once again, and its expansion continued through the 
1850s and 1860s. (See figure 1.) Thus, by 1856, work began on a series of three new port basins 
stretching northward along the coast. (The old and new port basins can be seen clearly in figure 
3, a plan of Marseille in 1877.) Figure 3 about here.] 
The basin that had been completed in 1853 had no significant effect on the organization of 
dock work. The system that had been used in the old port was simply transferred to the new. 
But the basins begun in 1856 were a very different matter. The concession for building, 
equipping, and running these basins was awarded to a joint stock company called the Compagnie 
des Docks et Entrepots de Marseille. This company, which was financed by Parisan capital, 
totally revolutionized methods of handling cargoes.46 First, the new dock was what was called a 
"dock a l'anglais" -- that  is, i t  introduced labor-saving equipment, of which steam-driven hydraulic 
cranes and lifts were the most important. Second, the quais were physically set off from the 
working-class neighborhoods of the old city. Third, all goods in entrep t would be concentrated in 
warehouses in the new basins, rather than being scattered through the city. Fourth, and most 
important of all, dockworkers were no longer to work in teams for the merchants whose goods 
were being unloaded: they would have to become employees of the Compagnie des Docks. Work 
was to be organized and policed not by the masters and the dockworkers' society, but by 
employees of the company. 
The dockworkers quickly recognized that  establishment of the new dock would gravely 
threaten their position. In 1858 they learned that all steam ships would be required to use the as  
yet uncompleted docks as  soon as provisional operations began. The dockworkers' society sent 
delegations to the company, the mayor, and the prefect to protest this regulation, which would 
effectively put the rapidly growing steamship trade beyond the society's reach. In  January 1859 
the dockworkers' society even obtained an  audience with Emperor Napoleon 111, who answered 
their plea with vague, and in the end empty, promises of solicitude: "Messieurs, you have done 
very well to count on me. I will do for your interests everything that  may be in my power. 1147 
When the docks began provisional operations in the summer of 1859, a number of dockworkers 
went to work for the company. The society forbade its members to do so and expelled all who did. 
In other words, it threatened to withhold labor from the company, demanding that  dockworkers be 
allowed to handle work for their merchants a s  before, without becoming the company's employees. 
The company, as  yet in a weak economic position, negotiated a compromise that  allowed society 
members to handle some kinds of work without becoming employees.48 But both sides knew that  
this was only a truce in a long battle, and that  the real showdown would come in 1864, when the 
Docks were scheduled to go into full operation. 
During its long struggle with the company, the dockworkers' society did its best to 
cultivate public opinion. It obtained the signatures of 850 merchants on a petition addressed to 
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the ministry of industry and commerce, and won the support of the Chamber of Commerce, the 
bastion of Marseille's merchant community.49 That it succeeded in gaining the support of the 
merchant community is impressive, since the docks were able to offer considerably lower price- 
rates than the dockworkers' society. In part, this support is a measure of the longstanding ties 
between the merchants and the dockworkers, especially the master dockworkers. The 
dockworkers' society -- for example in a memorandum addressed to Marseille's merchants in 
1859 -- made much of the paternal relations of "confidence" and "devotion" that existed between 
merchants and "their"  dockworker^.^^ But the merchants also had parallel grievances of their 
own. In the 1850s and 1860s, the entire world of Marseille's maritime commerce was 
restructured." One important development was the rise of steam navigation and joint-stock 
steamship companies. Steamships, which accounted for only ten percent of the cargoes entering 
the port of Marseille in 1840, accounted for 14  percent by 1850, 32 percent by 1860, and 44 
percent by 1870.j2 The early steamships were often owned by individuals or simple 
partnerships, but these small operators were soon pushed aside by large joint-stock steamship 
companies. Between 1852 and 1865, four companies -- the Messageries Imperiales, the Societe 
Generale de Transports Maritimes a Vapeur, the Compagnie Marseillaise de Navigation a Vapeur, 
and the Compagnie de Navigation hlixte -- came to dominate steam shipping in Marseille, 
accounting for almost 90 percent of the city's steamer tonnage by 1869. Only one of these 
companies, the Compagnie htarseillaise, was controlled by local capital; the majority of the capital 
in the other three was from Paris or ~ ~ 0 n . j ~  The rise of these steamship companies disrupted 
the traditional organization of commerce. Rather than forming a series of short-term partnerships 
for single voyages, merchants increasingly found themselves dealing with large bureaucratic 
shipping lines. Moreover, the steamship companies, together with the Compagnie des Docks, now 
rivaled the power of the traditional merchant community and its organ the Chamber of Commerce. 
Marseille's merchants, long the dominant force in the political and economic life of the city, were 
rapidly being displaced by "foreign" capital. "Marseille," as the scion of on old mercantile family 
put in in 1863, "no longer seems to belong to her~elf ." '~  In these circumstances, the 
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dockworkers' struggle against the Compagnie des Docks could be seen a s  a battle against foreign 
domination. As such, it won the support of the merchants and the Chamber of Commerce. 
If the battle against the company strengthened the bonds between merchants and 
dockworkers, it gradually opened a rift between masters and ordinary dockworkers. I t  was, of 
course, the masters whose position was threatened most drastically by the new7 dock. Ordinary 
dockworkers stood to lose their collective self- governance and to suffer a decline in earnings. But 
the master dockworkers risked the total annihilation of their peculiar function and status. The 
masters were willing to make dramatic gestures to gain the support of the merchants. In 1859 
they offered a ten percent reduction in piece rates that would come entirely from their own profits, 
without reducing the rates to be paid to the workers.55 But as  early as  1859 some of the 
ordinary dockworkers regarded the victory of the company as inevitable and wished to negotiate 
with the company rather than refusing to work a t  the dock altogether. In thls respect, it is 
interesting that the first thirty-seven dockworkers to sign up for work a t  the dock in August 1859 
had previously been employed not by merchants, but by the Messageries Imperiales steamship 
company -- they had, in other words, already made their peace with the new bureaucratic 
capitalist order. Another 290 workers came to sign up with the dock shortly after; all of these 
were expelled from the dockworkers' society.56 Throughout the struggle, it wTas always the 
masters who insisted on total non-cooperation, whereas a t  least some of the workers were willing 
to accept work a t  the dock if the terms were sufficiently favorable. 
In the summer of 1864, the dock began full-scale operation. Once again, the company 
insisted that anyone engaged in loading and unloading of ships be an employee of the dock, and 
once again the dockworkers' society responded by refusing to work under the company's 
conditions. This time the company was prepared; it simply manned the docks with unskilled 
laborers, especially Italian immigrants, and offered merchants lower rates than the dockworkers' 
society could match. Once again, a number of dockworkers took work with the company in 
defiance of the society, and were duly expelled. They brought suit, charging that the society had 
no right to exclude them for exercising their liberty to work where they wished. The court, a s  
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Julliany had predicted some twenty years earlier, ruled on behalf of the expelled men, striking a 
mortal blow a t  the society's powers. Not long after this decision the Emperor passed through 
Marseille, and was greeted by a demonstration of some 5,000 dockworkers and supporters. One 
of the society's priors addressed the Emperor, reminding him of the promises he had made in 
1859, and ended his speech with a cry of "Vive l'Empereur!" The Emperor once again promised 
to look into the affair, and a few months later the same prior went to Paris to negotiate a solution. 
But the solution he brought back to Marseille proved to be unacceptable to the society, and the 
effort ended in mutual recrimination. 57 
The outcome of the dockworkers7 struggle was a total victory for the company. Most of 
the society's members eventually went to work for the company, and the society, stripped of its 
monopoly and its once vast powers, faded into an ordinary mutual aid society that  administered 
sickness and retirement benefits. The merchants, in spite of their preference for the dockworkers' 
society, soon made their peace with the company a s  well. The company, after all, was able to 
offer them virtually everything the society had offered in the  past. It provided workers, organized 
and supervised dock work, maintained a secure and efficient entrepot, and protected the 
merchants' goods against losses through theft -- a task made easier by the physical separation of 
the new docks from the labyrinthine neighborhoods of the old city. Moreover, it could offer all this 
a t  a lower rate than the dockworkers' old price schedule. The merchants lost the personal 
satisfaction of paternal relations with trusted master dockworkers and had to put up with the 
bureaucracy of the new company. But unlike the dockworkers, their ou7n privileged and lucrative 
position in maritime trade was not genuinely damaged. A new level of capitalist organization had 
come to hlarseille's docks; to the merchants it meant a change in the tone and character of their 
work and the loss of their once unchallenged supremacy in the city's maritime economy. To the 
dockworkers it meant much more: the destruction of the cherished privileges of their society and 
the reduction of its members to ordinary proletarian wage laborers. 
The uneven capitalist development that  had fortified the dockworkers' privileged niche in 
the first half of the nineteenth century destroyed i t  in the 1860s. The general development of 
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French, European, and world capitalism caused a massive expansion in Marseille's maritime trade 
in the nineteenth century. But for some decades, this advance in capitalist development did not 
cause a corresponding advance in the methods of dock work. On the contrary, it actually 
strengthened an archaic form of labor organization on the docks -- the dockworkers' society, which 
was in fact a carryover from the guild system of the old regime. In this case, the unevenness that 
characterized all capitalist development also gave rise to combined development -- the 
strengthening of archaic forms in symbiosis with an advanced sector. But in the end, the 
exigencies of continuing capitalist development -- the need for more space in the port -- shattered 
archaic forms and obliterated the temporarily privileged position of the dockworkers. Marseille's 
dockworkers were, of course, a particular case, but a case that fits a very general pattern. The 
intrinsic and inescapable unevenness of capitalist development promiscuously creates privileged 
niches for laborers who are advantageously placed in a particular phase of development. But it 
also, no less promiscuously, destroys the same privileged niches it had created in earlier phases. 
How did the economic vicissitudes of work affect the dockworkers' politics? At first glance, 
the role of dockworkers in the three great revolutionary crises of the nineteenth century -- 1830- 
34, 1848-51, and 1870-71 -- appears to correspond admirably to the evolution of their economic 
circumstances. The dockworkers seem to have been radical, or a t  least politically restive, in the 
first crisis, before their rise to the high prosperity of mid-century; to have been notoriously 
reactionary a t  mid-century, when their privileges were a t  their height; and to have been ardent 
revolutionaries a t  the time of the Commune, when their society had been crushed and they had 
been definitively reduced to the status of a proletariat. 
During the crisis that extended from the July Revolution of 1830 to the suppression of the 
Lyonnais and Parisian workers' rebellions of April 1834, Marseille was not the center of a major 
radical movement. In fact, the local authorities of the new July Monarchy were a t  first much 
more concerned about the possibility of a popular uprising in favor of the ousted Bourbon 
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monarchical regime than about republican agitation. By 1833, however, a chapter of the 
revolutionary Society of the Rights of Man had been founded, and the police responded by 
infiltrating it with an informer. In April of 1834, a t  the time of the Lyonnais and Parisian 
insurrections, Marseille's society deliberated about launching a revolt of its own. According to the 
informer's report, among the most ardent advocates of violent action were three dockworkers, who 
claimed to be able "to direct a t  their will a t  least two hundred of their colleagues" in the event of a 
revolt. This claim may have been wildly exaggerated -- we will never know, because the Society 
of the Rights of Man finally decided against an insurrection. But it seems to indicate that a t  least 
a sizeable minority of the dockworkers had been touched by the radical agitations of the period.58 
The dockworkers' growing prosperity during the following decade and a half seems to have 
wiped out any remnants of radicalism. By February 1848, when the July Monarchy was 
overthrown and replaced by a republic, any claim that dockworkers would join a radical 
insurrection would have been dismissed as  ridiculous; all political factions assumed that 
dockworkers were unshakably conservative. This assumption explains the way they were treated 
by the the mayor of the fallen regime during his final hours in power. The news of the Parisian 
insurrection reached Marseille on February 24, but it was not until March 1 that the 
commissioner sent from Paris by the Provisional government could arrive and establish republican 
power in the city. During this interval, the mayor did what he could to strengthen the hand of 
conservatives. Most importantly, he called in supporters of the fallen regime, set them up as 
companies in the National Guard, and distributed to them all the city's available rifles. Nearly all 
the companies created by this maneuver were composed of merchants, professional men, 
shopkeepers, and clerks, but the dockworkers were armed to. a man and allowed to form a special 
company of their own. This was in the sharpest contrast to the treatment received by other 
workers. When they came to the city hall to join the National Guard, they were told that no arms 
were available. As one republican militant put it, "If the dockworkers were admitted, it was in 
the thought, which [the authorities] did not even trouble to dissimulate, that these men of the 
people, feudatories of their patrons the merchants, would serve to combat that other people, the 
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workers, whose very name brought on the shivers."59 In 1848, conservatives and revolutionaries 
were agreed that the dockworkers could be relied upon to act as  reactionaries. 
But the dockworkers' conservativism did not withstand the disasters of the 1860s. Their 
reduction from a privileged elite to ordinary proletarians made them notoriously hostile to the 
Imperial regime that had succeeded the Second Republic -- all the more so because the Emperor 
himself had twice deceived them during their struggle with the Compagnie des Docks by giving 
vague but empty promises of help. It is therefore hardly surprising that dockworkers figured 
prominently in a republican demonstration in Marseille in July 1870, two months before the 
overthrow of the Empire and the establishment of the Third Republic, nor that several 
dockworkers were active in Marseille's Commune in 1871. One of these, Etienne pere, was the 
Commune's second in command and was condemned to death after the suppression of the 
Commune -- although his sentence was subsequently commuted.6o The correlation with politics 
therefore appears straightforward: if the rise of the dockworkers to prosperity made them 
conservative by 1848, their fall from prosperity led them to political radicalism a t  the time of the 
Commune. 
On closer observation, however, this intimate association between economic situation and 
political behavior turns out to be flawed. I t  is true that the'dockworkers were staunch 
conservatives in 1848 and exemplary revolutionaries in 1871. But it turns out that their shift to 
the left began long before the demise of their economic fortunes. This can be seen most clearly in 
figures for participation in revolutionary activities in the decade following the Revolution of 1848. 
(See Table 2) Only three of the 270 men who were convicted of participating in Marseille's June 
1848 insurrection were dockworkers. Dockworkers therefore made up 1.1 percent of the 
insurrectionaries, as against 2.9 percent of the adult male population. There were six 
dockworkers among the 297 radicals rounded up after Louis Napolean's coup dY;tat in 1851. This 
was 2.0 percent -- still below the dockworkers' percentage of the population, but above the 1848 
figure. And when the police drew up lists in 1853, 1855, and 1858, composed of "dangerous 
individuals" who were to be rounded up if an insurrection should take place, dockworkers made up 
18 of 346 names -- 5.2 percent, or well above their proportion in the population. The same 
development, but even more pronounced, can be seen in the identities of men convicted of assorted 
political offenses over the same years. The offenses included were quite diverse -- the most 
common being politically motivated acts of violence against police or other authorities, membership 
in secret revolutionary societies, or singing subversive songs or uttering "seditious cries" in the 
streets. No dockworker was among the 20 convicted of such offenses in 1848 and 1849. In 1850 
and 1851, there were two dockworkers among the 51  men convicted -- close to their proportion in 
the population. And in the first eight years of the Second Empire, dockworkers made up eight of 
the 85 men convicted of political offenses, about triple their proportion in the population. [Table 2 
about here.] These figures are obviously insufficient a s  measures of the overall political opinions 
and behavior of the dockworkers. But. they would seem to indicate that  during their golden age, 
while their privileged position was still intact, dockworkers evolved from one of the most 
conservative and quiescent working-class trades to one of the most radical. 
There are other scraps of evidence that  indicate a general drift ~KI the left during the course 
of the Second Republic. The first sign was as  early as the June 1848 insurrection, when the 
dockworkers' national guard company -- originally formed, as  we have seen, a s  a bastion of 
reaction -- refused to respond to orders upon discovering that  they might be asked to fire on fellow7 
workers.61 A year later, there was a sign that  the dockworkers were moving toward a more 
insurgent position. In June of 1849, some 500 dockworkers held a banquet in honor of Louis 
Astouin, a dockworker who had written a widely acclaimed book of poetry, and who had just been 
defeated in a bid for re-election to the National Assembly on the democratic ticket. The banquet 
ended with the entire crowd shouting "Vive la Republique democratique e t  sociale!" and some 114 
francs were collected for the families of the insurrectionaries of the prior June who remained in 
custody.62 Neither of these actions would have been thinkable in the early days of the Second 
Republic. A final indication of the dockworkers' shift to the left is a remark made by Armand 
Audiganne, a prominent Parisian social investigator, in 1855 in his monumental Les Populations 
ouvrieres e t  les industries de la France. He reported that  the revolutionary movement of 1848 
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"received support above all from the corporation of the dockworkers, justly famous for their 
riotous temperament."63 This manifestly false statement would seem to be explained by the fact 
that he visited Marseille in 1852 or 1853, and projected the then evident radicalism of the 
dockworkers backwards in time to an era when, in fact, they were regarded by democrats and 
reactionaries alike as  staunch supporters of the existing social and political order. 
All the evidence points to a significant radicalization of dockworkers' political opinions and 
behavior between 1848 and the mid-1850s, a decade before the drastic restructuring of work 
reduced the dockworkers to a proletariat. I t  is therefore clear that changes in dockworker politics 
cannot be explained as  a simple reflex of proletarianization. Instead, the seemingly paradoxical 
rise of dockworker radicalism over the decade following the Revolution of 1848 requires a complex 
explanation, one that recognizes the simultaneous autonomy and interrelationship of economic, 
political, and social factors. 
Let us begin with economics. Although the dockworkers' favorable structural position in 
the maritime economy was not challenged in the late 1840s and 1850s, their economic well-being 
was sharply affected by short-term fluctuations. The traffic of Marseille's port fell precipitously in 
1848 and remained low for several years. (See the graph in Figure 1.) The revolutionary 
upheavals of 1848 in France and Europe caused a general panic among the possessing classes; 
credit dried up and investment fell, causing a general depression in industry and trade. I t  was not 
until 1852, when Louis Napoleon's coup d'etat had ended the fear of political instability, that the 
traffic of the port rebounded to the level of the middle 1840s again.64 The long commercial 
depression surely increased unemployment and sharply cut incomes on the docks, reducing the 
dockworkers to economic circumstances more or less comparable to those of the early l830s, 
when, as we have seen, they were also involved in revolutionary agitations. The dockworkers 
were not thrown into desperate poverty by the depression, and the Muse operated to distribute 
available employment equitably. Nevertheless, lower incomes and high levels of unemployment 
must have made dockworkers far more receptive to the republican and socialist agitations of the 
era than would have been the case had employment remained high. This economically induced 
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receptivity undoubtedly helps to explain the dockworkers' initial drift to the left from 1848 to 
1851. 
But this drift to the left had political a s  well a s  economic causes. If hard economic times 
made dockworkers more receptive to messages critical of the s ta tus  quo, revolutionary politics 
changed the nature and vastly increased the volume of such messages. The French Revolution of 
1848 made "worker" (ouvrier or travailleur) a politically potent term, and made the fact that  one 
belonged to the socio-economic category of manual workers politically relevant in a way it had 
never been before. Radical Parisian workers, allied with the socialist journalist Louis Blanc, had 
made the "organization of labor" the key issue of the revolution -- not only in Paris, but 
throughout France. The revolutionary provisional government declared the "right to work," 
established "national workshops" to give relief to the unemployed, and established the 
Luxembourg commission, headed by Louis Blanc, to draw up plans for a new "organization of 
labor." In  Marseille, as elsewhere in France in the spring of 1848, not only socialists, but public 
officials, moderates, and even the most reactionary monarchists addressed a blizzard of 
pamphlets, newspaper articles, speeches, handbills, and proclamations "to the workers." In 
Althusser's terminology, one could say that after February 1848 the utterance "worker" 
insistantly interpellated or hailed workers a s  ideologically defined political subjects.65 Bombarded 
by this massive outpouring of ideological discourse, even trades like the dockworkers, whose 
members had been apolitical or vaguely monarchist before 1848, must have been aware that  the 
revolution was promising to raise manual labor to a new dignity in the state and must have 
pondered what their unquestioned status as workers implied for their own role in politics. 
Much of the discourse directed specifically a t  Marseille's dockworkers in the spring of 1848 
came from conservative quarters and praised them for their "moderation." For example, on 
February 26, the day the dockworkers were incorporated into the national guard, the conservative 
newspaper Le Nouvelliste remarked that the dockworkers' firm repudiation of the "tumultuous 
demonstrations that  have alarmed this city" had 
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honored in the highest degree the working population [population ouvriere] of our 
city .... This evening more than two thousand of these estimable workers [ouvriers], 
armed and incorporated into the national guard, will eff~caciously stand guard to 
assure due respect to persons and property .... We do not doubt tha t  the noble 
example of the dockworkers' corporation will be followed by the entire working 
population [population ouvrierel of Marseille, because nowhere else, and we say 
this with a just pride, do the laboring classes [classes laborieuses] offer, to the 
same extent a s  ours, such guaranties of morality and devotion to the sacred bonds 
of the family, from which flow essentially all instincts of order and legality.66 
This article not only attempts to reinforce the dockworkers' conservativism, but holds up the 
dockworkers as  a model for all of Marseille's workers -- who, interestingly, are praised not so 
much for their political conservatism, as  for their apolitical attachment to family bonds, which is 
assumed to be a guarantee of good political behavior. Yet even this text paradoxically contributes 
to the dockworkers' identity as workers and, in spite of its reactionary intent, makes this identity 
a s  workers politically potent. 
From the very beginning of the revolution, Marseille's conservatives, by ostentatiously 
adopting the dockworkers as  the apotheosis of the apolitical "sage ouvrier," unwittingly 
contributed to their politicization. Once dockworkers had been encouraged to think of themselves 
a s  somehow exemplary of workers in general, they could not be prevented from recognizing that  
republicans and socialists were hailing all workers a s  constituents of a new and better state and 
society, a "democratic and social republic" in which labor would be properly "organized" and duly 
rewarded as  the basis of all wealth. By June of 1848 the republicans and socialists certainly had 
not succeeded in constituting dockworkers as  revolutionaries. But the fact that  the dockworkers' 
unit of the National Guard refused to report for duty at the time of the June insurrection because 
they were unwilling to fire on "fellow workers" indicates that  they had begun to accept "worker" 
as  a political identity and to act  on that  identity even against a n  express command of the forces of 
"order and legality." 
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The shift of political discourse tha t  took place in the spring of 1848, together with a sharp 
rise of unemployment, appears to have moved the dockworkers beyond the reactionary docility 
attributed to them by both monarchists and republicans in February. But i t  was not until 1849 or 
later that  dockworkers began to appear with some frequency in the ranks of Marseille's militant 
republicans and socialists. This delayed conversion of dockworkers to the radical movement was 
very unusual in Marseille; in virtually every other case, trades that  had not been radicalized by 
June of 1848 remained conservative or apolitical to the very end of the Second Republic. To 
explain the unusual case of the dockworkers, we must look not only at the general politicization of 
workers in 1848, but also a t  the unique details of their particular political history -- which, from 
1849 to 1851, were closely tied to the surprising career of Louis Astouin, the dockworker poet- 
politician. Astouin was initially named to the monarchist slate of candidates in the legislative 
elections of April 1848. The monarchists chose him because of his prominence and popularity as a 
worker-poet, assuming tha t  his apparent lack of pronounced political views indicated the docile 
conservatism for which his fellow dockworkers were famous. But in the National Assembly he 
turned out to be a sincere, if moderate, republican. He was therefore dropped from the monarchist 
list for the elections of 1849 and replaced by another dockworker of known reactionary opinions. 
The democrats, however, named Astouin to their list, and he responded by moving considerably to 
the left and espousing the cause of social democracy. Astouin turned out to be a tireless 
campaigner. Although narrowly defeated in the 1849 election, he continued to work for the 
democratic and social republic, right down to Louis Napoleon's coup d'etat in December 1851. 
Astouin's towering prestige among the dockworkers, together with his diligent and incessant 
proselytising, was surely a major source of the new political insurgency that  characterized the 
dockworkers after 1 8 4 9 . ~ ~  
How, then, is the radicalization of Marseille's dockworkers in the years following 1848 to 
be explained? First, the change was made possible by a revolutionary transformation of the state 
and a consequent. upsurge in radical disc'ourse that  established "the worker" as  a constituent of a 
new "democratic and social republic." This new vision of work and politics so dominated the 
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discourse of the spring of 1848 that  even conservative workers such as  the dockworkers could not 
escape a new politicized working-class identity. Second, the extended maritime depression of the 
Second Republic surely made dockworkers more receptive to the radical message than they would 
have been in a period of full employment. Finally, the particular political career of Louis Astouin 
meant that  the gospel of the "democratic and social republic" reached the dockworkers with special 
authority and intensity between 1849 and 1851. The confluence of these general and particular 
conditions had the effect of transforming dockworkers from notorious reactionaries to moderately 
active republicans by the end of the Second Republic. 
None of these factors, however, can explain the increasing prominence of dockworker 
militants in the underground republican movement that  followed Louis Napoleon's coup d'etat and 
the establishment of the Second Empire. The maritime economg-, after four years of depression, 
turned sharply upward in 1852, and remained relatively bouyant u, the end of the decade. After 
185 1, republican and socialist discourse was choked off by the tight censorship and oppressive 
police apparatus of the Imperial state. And Louis Astouin was arrested after the coup d'etat in 
1851, placed in internment in Valence and then in Besancon, and kept under close police 
surveillance when he returned to Marseille in 1853; he was no longer able to participate actively 
in the now illegal republican movement.68 Yet the dockworkers did not lapse back into their 
deferential conservatism of the 1840s. To judge from evidence in the archives of repression, 
summarized in table 2, dockworkers were among the most active trades in the underground 
republican movement that  took shape in Marseille in the 1850s; their participation in radical 
politics became more prominent as repression got more severe. In  my opinion, the most likely 
explanation for this increasing prominence is the extraordinary solidity of the dockworkers' social 
organization. The dockworkers' unparalleled organizational experience and their density of 
personal and institutional contacts made them unusually capable of sustaining the organizational 
efforts required in the political underground. The dockworkers' initial conversion to radical 
politics may have been slow, but once they were committed to the democratic and social republic 
their superior command of social resources moved them to the the center of the political struggle. 
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The dockworkers' politics, then, was far from a simple reflex of their relation to the means 
of production. Socio-economic conditions were far from irrelevant, but the evolution of dockworker 
politics cannot be explained without reference both to transformations in state structure and 
political discourse and to the details of politics and personalities in Marseille. To explain how 
Marseille's dockworkers were radicalized requires not just an  examination of their changing 
economic circumstances, but the construction of a multi-causal narrative that  takes into account, 
weighs, and attempts to establish the joint. and several explanatory power of social, economic, and 
political factors. 
Does this .mean that  declaring the autonomy of politics is just another form of the call for a 
"revival of narrative?" To some degree, perhaps i t  does: any attempt to explain historical change 
in a non-reductionist fashion implies a "narrative" concern for sequence, contingency, and agency. 
But the autonomy of politics should not be used a s  a license for historians to revel atheoretically in 
the particularity of each case's sequence of events, or to ressurect (as one might say I have done 
with Louis Astouin) the "great man" theory of history. The account of dockworker radicalization 
that  I have sketched out here is not a return to old-fashioned narrative history, but rather a 
theoretically motivated response to the (as yet insufficiently recognized) crisis of labor history's 
reigning explanatory strategy. 
If capitalist development is uneven in the sense I have been arguing in this essay -- that  is, 
if it produces not an increasingly solid and uniform proletarian continent but a continually 
changing archipelago of variegated working-class categories -- then the appropriate explanatory 
strategy for labor historians is not to look for evidence of proletarianization behind every surge of 
working-class political radicalism, but to ask hour and why workers with widely varying economic 
trajectories and work-place experiences could successfully be constituted as political insurgents. 
For some trades, in some historical instances -- for example, Christopher Johnson's French tailors 
in the 1830s and 1840s -- proletarianization surely is the most important single answer. But we 
would be wrong to take the tailors as epitomizing nineteenth-century working-class experience in 
general. This study of Marseille's dockworkers indicates that  even highly privileged workers 
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could, under certain conditions, be induced to identify themselves with less fortunate workers and 
struggle for a radical transformation of the social order. If we are to understand those occasions 
when a wide variety of workers joined radical revolts -- such as  the French workers' insurgencies 
of 1833-34, 1848-5 1, and 1870-7 1, the English Chartist movement, the New York labor uprising 
of 1850, or the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917 -- we must ask how economic changes, 
transformations of state structures and political discourse, new or preexisting networks of social 
relations, and purposive actions by prominent or strategically placed persons or groups made 
possible the construction -- a t  least for a time -- of a common working-class political identity and 
program. Such a stragegy should also help us explain why, in a capitalist economy that 
supposedly produces an increasingly uniform proletariat, such triumphs of class unity have 
repeatedly proved ephemeral. The case of Marseille's dockworkers should help us to see that 
socialism and class-consciousness are contingent and fragile achievements of political struggle, not 
necessary and automatic products of the development of capitalism. 
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Figure 1. Traffic of the port of Marseille, 1815-1870 
Figure 2. Marseille in 1837. Courtesy of the Archives de la Chambre de 
Commerce de Marseille. 
e 3. Marseille in 1874. Courtesy of the Archives de la Chambre de 
Commerce de Marseille. 
CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 
UNIVERSITY OF 1.TICHIGAN 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
The Center  f o r  Research on S o c i a l  Organizat ion is  a  f a c i l i t y  of t h e  
Department of Sociology,  The Un ive r s i t y  of Michigan. Its primary mission i s  t o  
suppor t  t h e  r e sea rch  of f a c u l t y  and s t u d e n t s  i n  t h e  depar tment ' s  S o c i a l  
Organiza t ion  graduate  program. CRSO Working Papers  r e p o r t  c u r r e n t  research  and 
r e f l e c t i o n  by a f f i l i a t e s  of  t h e  c e n t e r ;  many of  them a r e  publ ished l a t e r  elsewhere 
a f t e r  r e v i s i o n .  Working papers  which a r e  st i l l  i n  p r i n t  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  from the  
c e n t e r  f o r  a  f e e  of $2.00 f o r  any paper  under ;100 pages and $4.00 f o r  papers over 
100 pages. The c e n t e r  w i l l  photocopy out -of -pr in t  working papers  a t  c o s t  
(approximately f i v e  c e n t s  per  page).  Request cop ie s  of working papers ,  t h e  l i s t  
of o t h e r  c e n t e r  r e p r i n t s ,  o r  f u r t h e r  information about  c e n t e r  a c t i v i t i e s  from: 
Center f o r  Research on S o c i a l  Organizat ion,  The Univers i ty  of  Michigan, 4504 LSA, 
Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48,109-A 382 : (31 3 )764-7487. 
337 "Who Hates Bureaucracy? A Chinese Puzzle ,"  by Martin King Whyte, November 
1986, 23 pages 
338 "Levels of Mar i t a l  C o n f l i c t  Model: A Guide t o  Assessment and In t e rven t ion  
i n  Troubled Marriages,"  by Helen Weingarten, a l s o  PCMA Working Paper # 4,  
November ,1986, 25 pages. 
339 "Co l l ec t ive  Action and Violence I n  I r an :  ,1951-1 98.1 , " by Misagh Pa r sa ,  
November 4986, 52 pages. 
340 "Bridging t h e  Gap: I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Organizat ions a s  Organiza t ions ,  " by Gayl 
D. Ness and Steven R. Brechin, January ,1987, 42 pages. 
34:1 "Popular Response t o  China 's  F e r t i l i t y  T r a n s i t i o n , "  by Gu Shengzu, L i  Zhen, 
and Martin King Whyte, March :1987, 32 pages. 
342 "Self-Help Groups as In t e rvenor s  i n  Pa t ien t -Provider  Conf l i c t  i n  Heal th 
Care," by Mark Ches le r ,  March 1987, 30 pages. 
343 "Beyond Agreement: Value Judgements i n  C o n f l i c t  Resolu t ion  and Cooperative 
Conf l i c t  i n  t h e  Classroom," by A l f i e  Kohn, Apr i l  ,1987, -12 pages. 
344 " ~ r o g r a m  i n  Comparative Study of S o c i a l  Transformations,"  by William H. 
Sewell,  J r . ,  Terrence J. McDonald, ~ e f f e r e ~  M. Pa ige ,  and Sherry B. Or tne r ,  
May, ,1987, .15 pages. 
345 "P ro fes s iona l s '  Views of t h e  'Dangers' of Self-Help Groups," by Mark 
Ches le r ,  May ,1987, 29 pages. 
